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 INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND POLICY CENTER 
 
The International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center (IATPC) was established in 1990 
in the Food & Resource Economics Department (FRED) of the Institute of Food and 
Agricultural Sciences (IFAS) at the University of Florida. Its mission is to provide 
information, education, and research directed to immediate and long-term enhancement 
and sustainability of international trade and natural resource use. Its scope includes not 
only trade and related policy issues, but also agricultural, rural, resource, environmental, 
food, state, national and international policies, regulations, and issues that influence trade 
and development.  
 
The Center’s objectives are to: 
 
-  Support initiatives that enable a better understanding of U.S. and international 
trade policy issues impacting the competitiveness of Florida agriculture and all 
specialty crops and livestock nationwide; 
-  Serve as a nationwide resource base for research on international agricultural 
trade policy issues on all specialty crops and livestock; 
-  Disseminate agricultural trade related research results and publications; 
-  Interact with researchers, business and industry groups, state and federal agencies, 
and policymakers to examine and discuss agricultural trade policy questions. 
 
Programs in the IATPC have been organized around five key program areas. 
 
-  Risk Management and Capital Markets 
- Agricultural  Labor 
-  Regulatory Policy and Competitiveness 
-  Demand Systems and International Trade 
-  State and Local Government Policy and Agricultural Competitiveness. 
 
There are 10 faculty from the Food & Resource Economics Department who conduct 
research in these program areas for the IATPC. Each of these program areas has a set of 
projects that have been undertaken to address these critical areas of need. Faculty have 
acquired additional grant funds of more than one million dollars over the last three years 












Producer and Processor Rents Under the Byrd Amendment 




The  Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA) of 2000 allows 
producers and processors who successfully petition the U.S. government to impose 
antidumping (AD) or countervailing (CV) tariffs on competing imports to keep the 
proceeds of those tariffs.  Also known as the Byrd Amendment, it has already provided 
benefits to a variety of producers and processors in the United States, including more 
than $7 million
1 to Louisiana crayfish producers and processors and $65 million to U.S. 
candle makers.  These benefits originated from AD duties imposed on U.S. imports of 
Chinese products (King 2002).  One U.S. candle company, Candle-Lite, received $38 
million in fiscal year 2002, while a ball-bearings company, Torrington, received $37 
million in 2002 (U.S. Customs Service, 2003).  The Byrd Amendment also has financial 
implications for commodities, including citrus, steel, rubber, pencils, pineapple, and pasta 
(King, 2002).  In fiscal year 2002 alone, the U.S. government wrote checks totaling 
nearly $320 million to companies that could prove they were involved in any AD or CV 
duty case that eventually led to imposed tariffs (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2002). 
The Byrd Amendment effectively allows U.S. producers and processors to collect 
the resulting import-tariff revenue that would otherwise accrue to the U.S. government.  
Furthermore, even though CDSOA was passed in 2000, there is a grandfather clause that 
allows U.S. producer and processor groups to collect tariff revenues from certain AD and 
                                                 
* Andrew Schmitz, Professor, University of Florida; Troy Schmitz, Associate Professor, Arizona State 
University; and James Seale, Professor, University of Florida. 
1 All dollar amounts are given in U.S. dollars. CV duties that were implemented prior to the CDSOA.  The CDSOA has serious present 
and future welfare implications in terms of transfers of Ricardian rent among consumers, 
producers, and taxpayers.  It also provides an even greater incentive for a proliferation of 
future AD lawsuits. 
II.  The Byrd Amendment 
The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, also called the CDSOA 
or Byrd Amendment, was enacted on October 28, 2000, as Title X of the 2001 
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Appropriations Act (Act), Public Law 
106-387.
2  The CDSOA modified Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 by instructing U.S. 
Customs to put all collected AD and CV tariffs into special accounts, one for each case, 
and to pay out these collected revenues directly to companies that successfully petition 
the U.S. Government for these monies (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2002).   
Previously, the collected tariff revenues accrued to the general U.S. Treasury.  In order 
for a company to be eligible for payouts, it must prove that it successfully litigated an 
AD- or CV-duty case against a specific industry in a specific country.  If a company is 
eligible, it shares all past and future collected AD and CV duties with the other original 
litigating companies.  Companies that did not participate in the original AD- or CV-duty 
case do not receive any of the collected funds (eBearing.com, 2000). 
The CDSOA went into effect in 2001 and was controversial from its inception.  
President Clinton signed the Act but asked Congress to revisit and repeal the CDSOA 
before adjournment.  Congress, however, neither revisited nor repealed the Act.  In 
industries that receive protection from imports under U.S. AD- and/or CV-duty laws, 
                                                 
2 Senator DeWine (Ohio) was the original author of the CDSOA, but it was Senator Byrd (West Virginia) 
who added the CDSOA to the Agriculture Spending Bill of 2000. 
  2ineligible companies for CDSOA payouts complain that eligible companies receive an 
unfair advantage derived from these subsidies.  Small companies complain that their 
industry is harmed by unfair imports, but they do not have the money to hire expensive 
lawyers to litigate AD and/or CV cases. The budget report of the U.S. Treasury 
Department states that the CDSOA allows ‘double dipping’ because eligible companies 
not only receive protection from imports through increased import prices due to AD 
and/or CV tariffs, but now they also receive corporate subsidies from the collected AD 
and/or CV revenues (Thomas, 2003). 
U.S. trading partners have also reacted vigorously against the CDSOA.  Eleven 
World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries asked the WTO to form a panel to 
investigate the CDSOA with respect to U.S. obligations under the WTO Antidumping 
Agreement and the WTO Subsidies Agreement.  The WTO formed a panel on September 
10, 2001.  On September 16, 2002, that panel ruled against the United States on the 
CDSOA payments and recommended that the CDSOA be repealed (U.S. Department of 
State, 2003).  On October 18, 2002, the United States appealed the ruling to the WTO 
Appellate Body.  On January 16, 2003, the Appellate Body confirmed that the CDSOA 
was incompatible with WTO rules (Lamy, 2003). 
President Bush’s budget for fiscal year 2004 also calls for a repeal of the CDSOA.  
In spite of this repeal and the ruling of the WTO, as of February 4, 2003, 67 U.S. senators 
had signed a letter to the U.S. President requesting that he resist the WTO action and 
maintain the CDSOA.  With such strong support in the U.S. Senate for the CDSOA, it is 
still not clear that the law will be repealed. 
  3In fiscal year 2001, which was the first year of U.S. government CDSOA payouts, 
900 claimants received $230 million dollars (Table 1).  For the second year of payouts in 
2002, more than 1,200 claimants received approximately $330 million.   Although most 
of the payouts went to non-food companies, food companies received more than $22 
million in 2001 and nearly $20 million in 2002.  In 2001, there were 9 food-industry AD 
cases and 4 food-industry CV cases for which companies received tariff revenues under 
the CDSOA; whereas in 2002, there were 12 food-industry AD cases and 4 food-industry CV 
cases for which companies received payouts. 
 
  Table 1. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, fiscal years 2001 and 2002 
disbursements for food products. 
 







A-570-848 Crawfish  tail  meat/China  0 7,469 
A-475-818 Pasta/Italy  17,533 4,674 
C-475-819 Pasta/Italy  2,480 2,528 
A-533-813 Preserved  mushrooms/India  171 2,155 
A-351-605 Frozen  concentrated orange juice/Brazil  0 1,175 
A-570-831 Fresh  garlic/China  25 536 
A-549-813 Canned  pineapple/Thailand  1,792 531 
A-560-802 Preserved  mushrooms/Indonesia  83 443 
A-337-803 Fresh  Atlantic  salmon/Chile  0 173 
A-403-801  Fresh and chilled Atlantic salmon/Norway  46 59 
C-403-802  Fresh and chilled Atlantic salmon/Norway  18 29 
A-570-851 Preserved  mushrooms/China  0 20 
C-408-046 Sugar/European  Union  8 17 
C-489-806 Pasta/Turkey  7 9 
A-489-805 Pasta/Turkey  11 4 
A-570-855 Non-frozen  apple  juice concentrate/China  0 1 
A-301-602  Fresh cut flowers/Columbia  33 0 
 Food  Total  22,209 19,824 
  Grand Total for all Products  231,202 329,871 
aFiscal Year 
Source: U.S. Customs Service.(2003). 
 
 
In some cases, the same company that received payouts under an AD-duty case 
also received payouts under a CV-duty case.  As an example, eligible U.S. pasta firms 
  4shared $17.5 million and $4.7 million under AD case #A-475-818 in 2001 and 2002, 
respectively.  They also shared $2.5 million under CV-duty case #C-475-810 in both 
2001 and 2002. In another AD case (#A-540-843), Maui Pineapple received the entire 
portion of the $1.8 million in 2001 and $0.5 million in 2002 that originated from duties 
collected on canned pineapple imports from Thailand. 
In fiscal year 2002, crayfish firms received the largest food-industry CDSOA 
payouts (Table 2).  Of the 27 eligible firms, Atchafalaya Crawfish Processors received 
payouts of $800,000.  Four companies received payouts of over $500,000, and another 17 
firms received over $100,000.  On average, the 27 crayfish firms received $300,000.  In 
total, CDSOA payouts (Column 3) amounted to 21 percent of the total production and 
operating costs (Column 4) of these firms.  Also, in fiscal year 2002, three citrus 
processors received $1.18 million in CDSOA payouts.  Citrus World received 67 percent 
of the payouts for a total of $800,000 (Table 3).  
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Table 2. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, Disbursements for Crawfish Tail Meat 










Atchafalaya Crawfish Processors 3,758 793 10.6
Seafood International Distributors  3,347 707 9.5
Catahoula Crawfish  2,937 620 8.3
Prairie Cajun Wholesale Seafood Dist.  2,449 517 6.9
Bayou Land Seafood  1,990 420 5.6
Crawfish Enterprises, Inc. (CPA)
a 1,892 399 5.3
C.J.’s Seafood & Purged Crawfish  1,773 374 5.0
Riceland Crawfish  1,517 320 4.3
Cajun Seafood Distributors  1,511 319 4.3
Acadiana Fishermen’s Co-Op  1,508 318 4.3
Bonanza Crawfish Farm  1,482 313 4.2
Randol’s Seafood & Restaurant (CPA)
a 1,445 305 4.1
L.T. West  1,126 238 3.2
Sylvester’s Processors  1,036 219 2.9
Carl’s Seafood  1,037 219 2.9
Choplin Seafood  999 211 2.8
Blanchard Seafood, Inc (CPA)
a 990 209 2.8
Louisiana Seafood  947 200 2.7
Harvey’s Seafood  783 165 2.2
Louisiana Premium Seafoods  771 163 2.2
Bellard’s Poultry & Crawfish  502 106 1.4
Phillips Seafood  450 95 1.3
A&S Crawfish  330 70 0.9
Becnel’s Meat & Seafood  324 68 0.9
Teche Valley Seafood  225 48 0.6
Arnaudville Seaford  171 36 0.5
Lawtell Crawfish Processors  80 17 0.2
Total for Case #A-570-848  35,380 7,469 100.00
a CPA indicates member of the Crawfish Processors Alliance. 




Table 3. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, Disbursements for Frozen Concentrated 









Citrus World  277,335 784 66.7
A. Duda & Sons dba Citrus Belle  75,817 214 18.2
LD Citrus, Inc.   62,553 177 15.0
Total for Case #A-351-605  414,705 1,175 100.00
Source: U.S. Customs Service. (2003). 
 
  6III. Implications 
Under the Byrd Amendment, producers of import competing commodities gain 
from an antidumping duty in two ways.  First, internal prices rise from the tariff.  Second, 
they obtain the tariff revenue, which normally would go to the government.  This 
provides extra money to lobby governments for protection.  Interestingly, when the 
processor collects the duty, not only is the processor better off than under free trade, but 
so are the domestic competing producers with whom the processor deals.  In the absence 
of the Byrd Amendment, processors usually lobby for free trade. 
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